Telegram founder Pavel Durov has claimed that India’s largest telecom operator, Reliance, is sabotaging access to Telegram for millions of users outside India, including in countries such as the UAE. In Durov’s account, the disruption is not incidental network instability or a normal service outage. Instead, it appears to be the result of a specific and technically actionable method—BGP hijacking—used to redirect or break connectivity to Telegram’s infrastructure.
BGP hijacking is a form of routing manipulation that targets how internet traffic is directed across the global network. The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the system that allows internet service providers and other network operators to exchange routing information. Under typical circumstances, BGP routes are selected based on established and verified announcements from network operators. In a hijacking scenario, an attacker or misconfigured network can advertise incorrect routes, causing traffic destined for certain IP blocks or services to be diverted, intercepted, or dropped. Even if the affected service is functioning normally on its side, connectivity can degrade significantly for end users because their internet traffic is misrouted at the network level.
Durov’s allegation focuses on users “outside India,” implying that the problem is not limited to Indian territory and does not look like a standard domestic blocking measure that only affects local access. Rather, he suggests that the interference extends to other countries, meaning the routing disruption either impacts cross-border paths or relies on global routing behavior in which traffic leaving or passing through certain networks carries the fault. This matters because it shifts the nature of the claim from a local regulatory dispute to a broader international connectivity issue.
According to Durov, Telegram has observed patterns consistent with intentional sabotage rather than accidental disruption. He implies that the behavior has been persistent or repeated enough to raise red flags, and that it aligns with a rogue method—again, BGP hijacking—used to interfere with Telegram’s reach. This would place the responsibility not merely on some abstract internet problem, but on the deliberate control of routing announcements.
The core of the claim is also about responsiveness—or lack of it. Durov says Reliance has ignored multiple reports. In the narrative presented, Telegram or its technical teams allegedly identified the problem, reported it, and provided evidence or technical details indicating the suspected routing manipulation. Yet, despite these reports, the disruption continues. Durov interprets this continued behavior as evidence of intent: if the operator had responded appropriately, investigated, and corrected routing announcements, access issues would likely have decreased or disappeared. Instead, the persistence suggests either a failure to address the underlying network behavior or a continuation of the same blocking approach.
Durov’s statement links the technical mechanism to a larger strategic question: why would such a disruption be pursued, and how would it benefit anyone? He suggests it may be part of a competitive war. In competitive telecom or messaging ecosystems, some players may attempt to influence consumer behavior by disrupting rivals’ services. While many countries address messaging platforms through regulation, Durov’s framing implies that the method being used here is not a conventional legal block but a network-layer interference strategy that can bypass typical policy processes and create international collateral effects.
The allegation carries additional significance because the scale described—millions of users—indicates that the impact is broad. When a service is disrupted via BGP hijacking, the users affected can be widespread depending on how traffic is routed and which networks or peering relationships propagate the incorrect route advertisements. If the routing manipulation influences large segments of global traffic, many users may experience intermittent failures, inability to load the service, or degraded connectivity without any clear reason visible on the user end.
The story emphasizes that the disruption is “seems intentional” due to the ignored reports. This is an important distinction: network operators sometimes encounter misconfigurations, and those can cause temporary interruptions. But intentional sabotage is a stronger claim, relying on evidence of repeated behavior, refusal to cooperate, or failure to rectify after being informed. Durov’s framing suggests that Telegram’s reporting did not trigger remediation, reinforcing the view that the operator either had knowledge of the issue and allowed it to continue or did not act because the disruption served a desired outcome.
While the statement is centered around Telegram and Reliance, the broader context is about trust and transparency in internet infrastructure. BGP hijacking is especially concerning because it demonstrates how internet stability can be undermined by manipulation at the routing layer. Unlike content-based blocking that targets specific domains or application features, BGP hijacking can interfere with entire IP ranges, affecting services beyond their intended boundaries. This means the technique can harm not only specific services but also the broader reliability of internet communications across regions.
The dispute also reflects the increasing political and economic tensions that can surround communications technologies. Messaging services are often tied to public conversation, business operations, and political organizing. When access disruptions occur, they may have real-world consequences: users might miss time-sensitive information, be unable to communicate reliably, or experience delays that frustrate adoption. If the disruption reaches outside India, it may also cause diplomatic friction or consumer backlash in other jurisdictions affected by the connectivity issues.
Durov’s claim suggests that Reliance’s alleged actions could be part of a competitive strategy, though the specific competitors or motivations are not laid out in detail in the brief core narrative. Still, the logic in Durov’s account is straightforward: if a messaging service is disrupted through a technical sabotage method, users may turn to alternatives, partnerships, or locally preferred platforms, giving an advantage to the entities that control the network paths. In competitive scenarios, such advantages can be significant—especially when disruptions are consistent and affect large populations.
Even if the immediate focus is Telegram, the allegation highlights a wider problem: the vulnerability of internet routing to abuse. BGP is designed for distributed routing decisions made by many network operators. The system’s trust model assumes that route announcements are honest and that operators follow best practices. However, hijacking demonstrates that if an operator chooses to advertise routes incorrectly, they can shape where traffic goes. The result can be service disruptions that are difficult for end users to diagnose, because the issue is rooted deep in network infrastructure.
In terms of the user experience, the consequences of BGP hijacking can vary. Some users may see total inability to connect, while others may experience partial failures such as difficulty loading messages, delays, or periodic timeouts. Those effects can be especially confusing because they might not align with the service provider’s own status pages. Instead, the failures appear to originate from network routing inconsistencies, with different impacts across regions and internet providers.
Durov’s claim also frames the alleged behavior as a “rogue method,” implying wrongdoing rather than a sanctioned or transparent action. In legal or policy-driven cases, blocking is typically done via clearly defined regulations and processes, not through covert routing manipulation. By characterizing the method as rogue and pointing to ignored reports, Durov suggests the action bypasses legitimate channels.
Another key element is the geographic scope described. If the disruption affects “millions of users outside India (including the UAE),” it implies cross-border network effects. Internet traffic is not contained by national borders; it travels through multiple networks, peering points, and transit providers. A network operator’s route decisions can influence traffic leaving one region for destinations reached via international peering. Therefore, interference that originates from a major provider in one country can manifest in another, particularly if routing announcements propagate or influence transit decisions.
Durov’s allegation, therefore, is not simply about whether Telegram is accessible inside India. It is about whether infrastructure decisions made by a provider could be harming connectivity elsewhere. This transforms the issue from a local dispute into a broader concern about how the global internet is managed and protected against abuse.
In conclusion, Pavel Durov alleges that Reliance is undermining Telegram access for millions of users outside India using BGP hijacking, a network-layer technique that can redirect or disrupt traffic through manipulated routing announcements. Durov claims the disruption appears intentional because Reliance allegedly ignored multiple reports and did not remediate the problem after being informed. He suggests the motive could be part of a competitive war in which network influence is used to disadvantage rivals and shift user behavior toward preferred alternatives. The story, as presented, underscores both the scale of the disruption and the seriousness of routing manipulation as a method for targeting services at the infrastructure level. According to the account shared by Durov in the original publication (Source: Source).
Pavel Durov: Indian telecom Reliance is sabotaging access to Telegram for millions of users OUTSIDE India (including the UAE) via a rogue method called BGP hijacking. The sabotage seems intentional, as Reliance has ignored multiple reports. This may be part of a competitive war, as. #breaking
— @durov May 1, 2026
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